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In his exploration of painful Hispanic pasts, Professor José Colmeiro 
examines several interfaces between national and international memories 
and (relatedly) processes of transitional justice. While acknowledging that 
the main factors impelling the quest for historical justice lie within national 
boundaries, he also asks how far the pursuit of claims for transitional justice 
can be assisted by the transference of knowledge about the past across 
international borders. His answer is cautiously positive: the recent escalation 
of globalizing tendencies, which have so much capacity for harming people 
and environment through (for example) the operations of multinational 
corporations, can also assist the propagation of revival of memory by past 
and/or presently oppressed groupings. Moreover, this globalized transfer 
of knowledge can have an applied effect for those groupings through their 
garnering of popular and official international support. Additionally, in 
some cases, reverse transfer of memory-knowledge from struggles in other 
jurisdictions – including methods of struggle, reconciliation and reparations 
– can add value to the quest for historical justice.
 Colmeiro’s views resonate with those of scholars operating within quite 
different jurisdictional environments, such as Canada’s Professor Ken Coates.1 
In their case studies, Colmeiro and Coates are careful to adumbrate basal 
nation-specific factors. A vast amount of scholarly production underpins 
Treaty of Waitangi-based historical reconciliation processes, but as most of 
it is applied history geared to attaining reparational redress, it has generally 
avoided contextualizing Maori grievances against the Crown within global 
meta-narrative (or any other) context. ‘Treaty scholarship’, in short, is 
quintessentially inwards-looking by the very nature of its intended main 
audiences, the Crown and the Waitangi Tribunal.
 But there is more to it than that. From the 1970s a strong movement 
arose to rescue New Zealand history from Eurocentric domination, and the 
establishment of the Stout Research Centre was one key result. With the 
focus increasingly upon the New Zealand past in its own right, the academic 
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history of Crown-Maori relations (especially) became inwardly focused, not 
surprisingly given the huge amount of work needed to be done by revisionist 
historians.2 But now that the autochthonous groundwork has been done, an 
international dimension is not an optional extra (indeed if it ever were).
 This applies not just to scholarship but also, if relatedly, to ways of seeking 
justice for the aggrieved. Placing national perspectives in the context of 
global imperial and post-colonial developments can very positively enhance 
analysis focused on events which have occurred within national boundaries. 
In countries with painful historical injustices which have been subjected 
to official and popular amnesia, for example, a contextualization which 
sees past traumas not as essentially national-exceptionalist, but as part of 
or akin to imperial or other transnational experiences, can have profound 
academic consequences. This may in turn well have internally-generated 
policy ramifications in terms of addressing historical justice.
 Furthermore, the taking of such knowledge into the international arena 
by knowledge transfer, victims’ appeals to international institutions and 
audiences, and the like, can lead to very positive nation-specific public policy 
ramifications. As Colmeiro notes, protests and struggles which travel across 
borders can enthuse and inspire individuals and groups, and reconciliatory 
or reparational methods and solutions can be adopted or adapted (especially 
between jurisdictions of common politico-cultural background). The New 
Zealand Crown’s apology to Waikato-Tainui in 1995 gave succour, for 
example, to the Australian campaign for official apology to the Aboriginal 
people.3
 However, this example serves to remind us that, even with nations of similar 
politico-cultural origins, the struggle for historical justice can only come 
from within significant elements (at very least) of the affected communities 
if is to have meaning – let alone chance of success. The international 
dimension, in short, can only strengthen a pre-existing autochthonous 
edifice. The theme of the conference which generated Professor Colmeiro’s 
paper, in its juxtaposition of actual past parallels with possible convergent 
futures, hints at this. The past oppressions which underpin transitional justice 
aspirations and processes in the Hispanic world and New Zealand are quite 
different in their specificities, especially in relation to the interconnected 
issue of time and agency. Maori grievances under the Treaty of Waitangi 
settlement processes generally focus on nineteenth century events, and are 
being addressed by the Crown because of the powerful political effectiveness 
achieved by Maori during the Maori Renaissance from the 1970s. The tangata 
whenua (people of this land) also have the iconic Treaty of Waitangi (whose 
Maori version promised them rangatiratanga, or – loosely – autonomy) to 
provide nationally specific organizational and ideological perspectives that 
have enhanced their struggle in ways unavailable to the Aboriginals – or 
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for that matter, to many North American tribes, even some which signed 
historical treaties. The grievances that are being addressed in the Hispanic 
world relate to more recent events, retrievably within the historical memory 
of present and immediately past generations, and advanced by people who, 
for nation-specific reasons, have been able to wield a far lesser degree of 
agency than have Maori.
 It might well be argued that Maori worldviews, which look backwards 
to go forward and whose orality brings (what is for the West) a distant 
past palpably into the present, do supply the equivalent of recent memory. 
However, because the grievances referred to by Colmeiro and/or attempts 
to address them have ‘live victims’ or their immediate families and friends 
to testify and agitate, there may be greater pressures and impulses to settle 
grievances and reconcile with the past. Moreover, placing recent historical 
memory (in western terms) in front of international (especially institutional) 
audiences might lead to a more sympathetic reception than grievances 
from a century or two ago – a reflection of the dominance of westernized 
memory in a globalizing world, perhaps, but more likely to get traction than 
indigenous past-in-the-present ways of looking at the world.
 That being said, Maori representatives have frequently addressed 
international forums, appealed to international organizations, and forged 
bonds with many indigenous peoples in varying circumstances. Their 
struggles for the Crown to respect rangatiratanga and to pay reparations 
for past devastations have both been inspired by and inspired self-
determinationist and other movements elsewhere. More importantly for the 
purposes of this response, as Colmeiro would no doubt surmise, Maori 
struggles to assert rangatiratanga may well have been boosted at times by 
pressure from international agencies lobbied by Maoridom.4
 And yet we come back to the specifics of the national situation. Despite 
its international reputation for being in the vanguard of historical reparations 
and reconciliation, New Zealand governments weathered almost universal 
international opprobrium for several years for refusing to sign the United 
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. Both this fact, 
essentially a reflection of concern at potential ramifications from recognizing 
the right to self-determination, and the fact that it was the Maori Party in the 
governing coalition which secured New Zealand’s signature in 2010, indicate 
the significance of the fundamental importance of national specificities.
 Given the richness of New Zealand’s exploration of Crown-Maori relations 
after the scholarly ‘inwards turn’ from the 1970s, and the international 
renown of its treaty-based settlement processes, scholars of these matters 
can usefully contribute to the exploration of hypotheses about the positive 
uses of international memory transfer as a means of retrieving historical 
knowledge, and then addressing it. An increasing scholarly, bureaucratic and 
Journal of New Zealand Studies
132
tribal propensity to look beyond Treaty settlements (officially scheduled to 
end by 2014, although very few scholars and practitioners believe this to 
be achievable) can both feed into and reflect international developments. 
Many are now engaged in the search for ongoing constitutional or other 
arrangements which properly embody a bicultural partnership between 
the tangata whenua (people of the land) and the Crown, replicating at a 
political level what is happening at societal level. But before and after 
2014 this will remain a very New Zealand argument, and any potential 
solutions will need to be based on the specifics of the New Zealand 
situation – the Treaty of Waitangi and Te Tiriti o Waitangi, and how to 
insert increasingly multicultural developments into the foundational Crown-
Maori relationship.5
 In summary, transferring knowledge of historical memory across borders, 
to both people and organizations, can assist the quest for historical or 
transitional justice by an oppressed grouping or people within a nation-state. 
Their struggles are likely to have been influenced by international campaigns 
for social justice, just as Maori were influenced during their ‘Renaissance’ 
from the early 1970s by overseas resistance or liberation movements 
such as Black Power and the American Indian Movement. Outcomes are 
likely to be enhanced by the support of international voices, non-official 
and official, which are powerful enough to pressure governments – and 
which are themselves influenced by the degree and nature of their support 
in international community, and by solidarities with negative historical 
memories and their addressing in jurisdictions around the world.
 But at the most fundamental level, the strength of their cause lies in 
persuading their own country’s population and government to retrieve 
lost or supplanted memories.6 Globalized networks of indigenous and 
other victims reclaiming and exercising their agency are a useful adjunct, 
enhanced by instant accessibility of information over the web; but they 
remain supplementary to what must remain the main focus of struggle – 
the victims persuading people and governments to overcome their historical 
amnesia and to act upon the recovered memories in the interest of social 
justice and harmony.
 In this, scholars have a role, and the international dimensions they add 
will enhance the efficacy of that role (although many of their contributions 
become bastardized through propagation7). One way of advancing ways of 
self-determination by an ethnic minority, for example, is to explore ways of 
melding western theoretical paradigms and approaches with tribal knowledge 
systems and methodologies. This is a task being tackled internationally, if 
incipiently, and New Zealand scholars can both learn from and contribute to 
it.8 Scholarship can then feed into international policymaking. As Eduardo 
González, Director of the International Center for Transitional Justice’s 
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Truth and Memory Program, recently noted, the ‘overdue encounter between 
the two emerging fields of [Transitional Justice] and Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples’ requires a great deal of ‘significant research and practical work’.9 
The effort is worth it, for the stakes are high.
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